By Aleksandr Yeliseev
Category: Stalin and the State
January 2, 2009
Created: January 2, 2009
Updated: December 5, 2016
Views: 21,238
At the 8th Extraordinary Congress of Soviets held from November 25 to December 5, 1936, the so-called “Stalin Constitution” was adopted, under which our country lived for 41 years. On December 12, 1993, a national referendum saw the majority supporting the draft of the currently active Fundamental Law.
On the Brink of the Abyss
The 1993 Constitution emerged from intense political struggles between supporters of President Boris Yeltsin and proponents of the Supreme Soviet. The country stood on the verge of civil war, a scenario unimaginable two years prior when these opponents belonged to the same “democratic” camp.
Meanwhile, Joseph Stalin foresaw such a conflict as possible. In his report, On the Draft Constitution of the USSR (December 1936), he criticized a proposal to reform the political system: “They propose an addition to Article 48 of the draft Constitution, suggesting that the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR be elected not by the Supreme Soviet, but by the entire population. I believe this addition is incorrect, as it does not align with the spirit of our Constitution. In our system, there should be no sole president elected by the entire population, equating with the Supreme Soviet and potentially opposing it.”
As it happened, attempts to establish a presidential-Soviet republic led to a colossal confrontation between Yeltsin and the deputies.
Stalin understood what the “reformers” of the Perestroika era failed to grasp: one cannot mix two entirely different political systems.
The “Perestroika architects” attempted to combine the irreconcilable – creating all-powerful Soviets while simultaneously introducing a presidential office.
Though the USSR’s first (and last) president was elected at the Congress of People’s Deputies, this move leaned toward a presidential republic. Amendments introduced suggested a popular vote, paving the way for direct presidential elections.
But the crux lies beyond that. In 1990-91, sharp conflict unfolded between two powerful centres – the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation. Amid this conflict, the RSFSR leadership under Yeltsin sought political and administrative advantages, with the presidency, elected by the entire populace, proving beneficial. Undoubtedly, a popularly elected president appeared more legitimate than one elected by deputies. Here, the RSFSR overtook the Soviet centre in an historical curve. Even in 1996, “popularly elected president” sounded like a “magical” phrase.
In 1991, a strong Soviet hierarchical system remained intact. This dualism became the root of prolonged political conflict. We managed to skirt the edge of the abyss, after which Russia emerged as a presidential, even “super-presidential,” republic.
A New Type of Republic
In December 1936, Stalin envisioned a different republic. His ideal was a tripartite political system: “parliament-party-government.” Stalin intended the Council of People’s Commissars (CPC) as the administrative core, working closely with the Supreme Soviet (SS) as the voice of the people. The CPC would be accountable to the SS but retain strong autonomy.
The Supreme Soviet supported the CPC on one side, while the Communist Party (CPSU(B)) upheld it on the other. Stalin saw the Party as an ideological-political vanguard, educating the people and wielding primarily spiritual influence. This system reflected, at a new level, the structure of traditional societies, organized by clergy, nobility and the working people.
In this model, the clergy corresponded to the Party, the nobility to the government and the people to the Soviets.
Stalin saw himself as the Party leader, the formal head of state (Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars) and the informal leader of the people, embodying a monarch-like archetype above all three spheres.
In 1936, however, Stalin was not head of government. The Council of People’s Commissars was led by his old comrade Vyacheslav Molotov, while Stalin focussed on managing the Party, or more precisely, the Party apparatus. Stalin found this administrative role burdensome, and in many letters, he referred to himself as “a mere secretary,” revealing some frustration with bureaucratic duties. It’s also noteworthy that in October 1927, Stalin proposed making himself head of government, following the defeat of the Left Opposition (Trotsky-Zinoviev faction) in the Party. He felt that controlling the Party apparatus was no longer necessary. However, then-Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars Alexei Rykov opposed losing his post.
Subsequent events, including a new phase of internal Party struggle (now against the “Right” – Bukharin and Rykov) and collectivization, radicalized life in the country and strengthened the Party apparatus as the custodian of orthodox Bolshevik values. In the provinces, regional Party secretaries acted like absolute rulers, modelling themselves on Stalin’s cult of personality. This situation became intolerable.
The Stalin Plan for Democratization
After completing collectivization and the initial successes of industrialization, Stalin began to contemplate how to end the dominance of Party officials and shift the centre of power to where it was intended to be – the state structures. Constitutional reform was aimed precisely at achieving this goal. The 1936 Constitution explicitly outlined various citizen rights and freedoms, leading many observers to call it the most progressive and democratic. Today, people laugh at this notion, pointing to the events of 1937-38. However, Stalin indeed planned extensive democratization, without emulating the West (with its multi-party system, where power shifts from one financial-industrial group to another).
Joseph Vissarionovich proposed genuinely competitive elections for the Supreme Soviet, which would replace the cumbersome multi-tiered system of the Congress of Soviets. In Yuri Zhukov’s book, Another Stalin, a photocopy of the proposed 1937 ballot is included, showing three rival candidates running for the Council of Nationalities from the Dnepropetrovsk district. The first candidate was nominated by the general assembly of factory workers, the second by the collective farmers, and the third by local Party and Komsomol committees. Copies of voting protocols affirming the principle of alternatives in future elections have also survived, bearing the signatures of Stalin, Molotov, Mikhail Kalinin and Andrei Zhdanov, leaving no doubt that Stalin and his associates initiated electoral alternatives.
Such elections would have forced nominees from Party organizations to face serious competition from non-Party candidates and public organizations, undoubtedly filtering out complacent Party bureaucrats accustomed to the revolutionary mentality of the civil war and collectivization periods.
Simultaneously, Stalin planned to introduce another filter – a Party filter. He advocated for secret elections of Party leadership at all levels. This filter, combined with the Soviet filter, would further “weed out” the bureaucrats.
However, the Party oligarchy grew highly concerned with these plans. First secretaries began warning about numerous “enemies of the people” in the country, suggesting that free elections were premature.
Stalin commented on this: “…If people in some places elect hostile elements, it will mean our propaganda work is poorly conducted, and we deserve such shame…”
The differing approaches to reforming the country are evident in materials from the February-March 1937 Plenum of the Central Committee. Stalin and his closest allies (Molotov, Zhdanov, etc.) spoke calmly, emphasizing the need for election preparation. In contrast, “regional bosses” such as Stanislav Kosior (Communist Party of Ukraine), Robert Eikhe (West Siberian Regional Committee) and Ivan Vareikis (Far Eastern Regional Committee) delivered bloodthirsty speeches. Later, Eikhe proposed creating the infamous “troikas” of the first secretary, prosecutor and NKVD head. Through these extraordinary structures, regional leaders hoped to strengthen their power and eliminate dissent.
In this climate, Stalin decided to engage in the terror that could no longer be halted but might engulf him as well. The machinery of repression spun into motion, and the planned elections were disrupted. Ironically, the initiators of repression became its victims, killed as “enemies of the people.”
Despite these challenges, Stalin achieved some reformist success. The December 1936 Constitution removed restrictions on certain social categories deemed “exploiters,” and elections became secret, making them somewhat closer to being “free.”
Furthermore, Stalin significantly enhanced the role of government in the state-political system. Various operational-coordination structures were established within the Council of People’s Commissars (Soviet defence and economic committees, later merged into a single Bureau), the number of deputy chairs increased and each commissariat introduced a personnel deputy. Finally, on May 4, 1941, Stalin realized his long-standing ambition of becoming head of government.
Failed Reforms
This marked the peak of his state-political reforms. Subsequently, he attempted three more major reorganizations.
In January 1944, Stalin tasked Georgy Malenkov with drafting a resolution of the Central Committee On Improving Local Government Bodies. It proposed: “a) to end the harmful practice of duplication and parallelism in managing economic and cultural construction by local Party and state bodies… and concentrate operational management in state organs… b) to strengthen state bodies with the most authoritative and experienced cadres… c) to focus Party organizations on fully supporting state bodies, elevating their role and authority, freeing Party bodies from administrative-economic functions and establishing proper division of duties between Party and state organs; d) to require local Party leaders to restructure relations with Soviet organs…” (Stalin: Secrets of Power by Yuri Zhukov).
A Plenum of the Central Committee was expected to decide the fate of this project. However, the Political Bureau rejected the proposals by Stalin and Malenkov due to strong resistance from the Party nomenklatura.
After the war, Stalin assigned Zhdanov to draft a new program for the Communist Party, intended for adoption at the 1947 Party Congress. The program aimed to radically transform life in the country, proposing that all citizens would participate in managing the USSR, with governance focussed solely on regulating economic activities. All citizens would perform state functions in rotation while continuing their professional work.
According to the project’s designers, every government position in the USSR was to be elective, with nationwide votes on all major political, economic, cultural and social issues.
Citizens and public organizations were to be granted the right to directly petition the Supreme Soviet (Birth of a Superpower: The USSR in the Early Postwar Years by A.A. Danilov and A.V. Pyzhikov).
The 1947 congress never took place, and the reforms were postponed. Nonetheless, Stalin’s desire to change the Soviet system is evident from the project’s content.
Finally, in November 1952, at the Central Committee Plenum held after the 19th Party Congress, Stalin proposed to step down from his role as Central Committee secretary to focus on the Council of Ministers. He aimed to weaken Party nomenklatura control over the state. However, Plenum participants rejected this proposal, presenting their refusal as loyalty to Stalin.
Party Bureaucracy’s Revenge
After Stalin’s death, Nikita Khrushchev came to power, reinforcing the Party bureaucracy. He also aspired to create his own constitution as an alternative to Stalin’s. A special constitutional commission worked on it from 1962 to 1964. Notably, the Central Committee issued a memo to commission members: “In his time, Stalin explained that the Constitution reflects achievements while the Party Program declares future goals. This view is incorrect. There should be no divide between the state’s Constitution and the Party Program.”
The difference between Stalin’s and Khrushchev’s approaches was evident.
The 1936 Constitution defined the Council of Ministers as the “highest organ of state administration,” while Khrushchev’s project aimed to call it an “executive and administrative body.” The commission suggested enshrining the CPSU’s leading role, though there were also provisions to strengthen the Soviets, primarily concerning economic issues.
In 1964, Khrushchev was ousted, and the adoption of a new Constitution was delayed (though work on it continued). It was eventually adopted in 1977, cementing the CPSU’s role. Article 6 proclaimed: “The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the leading and guiding force of Soviet society, the core of its political system, state and public organizations. The CPSU exists for and serves the people. Armed with Marxist-Leninist teachings, the Communist Party determines the general development perspective of society, internal and foreign policy lines of the USSR, directs the great creative activity of the Soviet people, and gives a planned, scientifically grounded character to their struggle for the victory of communism.”
The previous Constitution also outlined the Party’s role but not as strongly. Notably, it appeared in Article 126, whereas the Brezhnev Constitution highlighted it at the beginning. Furthermore, Article 126 first described citizens’ associations: “To meet the interests of the working people and to develop the organizational initiative and political activity of the people, citizens of the USSR are guaranteed the right to form public organizations: trade unions, cooperatives, youth organizations, sports and defence organizations, cultural, technical and scientific societies…” Only after this did it state: “…The most active and conscientious citizens from the ranks of the working class, collective farmers and working intelligentsia voluntarily join the Communist Party… representing the vanguard of workers in their struggle for building a communist society and serving as the guiding nucleus of all organizations, both public and state.”
See the difference.
The Brezhnev Constitution was the triumph of Party bureaucracy, which, eight years later, would begin a destructive restructuring, conducted without Stalin’s foresight. The results are well known – the dissolution of the Union and the severe political crisis of 1992-93.
Source: http://stoletie.ru
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