The CIA also confirmed that the Home Army was hated by most of the Polish population.
The History of the USSR & the Peoples’ Democracies
Chapter 13, Section 4, Subsection 6 (C13S4.6)
Saed Teymuri
According to the report by Gomulka:
Up to the elections reaction thought that factories and heavy industry would pass after these into their hands and now there may be sabotage in production resulting in non-accomplishment of the three-year plan showing up PPR as inefficient. The blowing up of the Martin furnace in the Glivitz region is the first act of sabotage by underground men. (Political Report made by First Secretary Executive Committee Polish Communist Party (PPR), CIA, August 7, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)
Referring to the above paragraph by the First Secretary, the CIA agent who had translated Gomulka’s report re-emphasized:
this really happened…. (Political Report made by First Secretary Executive Committee Polish Communist Party (PPR), CIA, August 7, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)
That is, the CIA agent emphasized that the Underground’s sabotage operation against the Martin furnace occurred for the purpose of depicting the ‘PPR as inefficient’ and that more of such sabotage operations may occur. The ‘Underground’, the term used for the various cells of the Home Army (AK), was engaged in combat against Poland’s industrial production, so to render Poland weaker.
Throughout the next six years, several US intelligence reports frequently confirmed the criminality and exposed the fascist nature of the Polish Underground State. Note that unlike the foregoing report by Gomulka, which the CIA agent nevertheless acknowledged as ‘truthful’, the following intelligence documents were not translations of the public statements of Polish government and PPR officials, but were rather reports written and submitted by CIA agents themselves.
A 1947 CIA document confirmed that the ‘Right extremists’ held the upper hand in the Polish Underground guerrilla movement:
Politically, the Resistance includes all elements ranging from the anti-Stalinist to the reactionary groups. Generally, the extremists, particularly the Right extremists, are stronger among the Partisan formations, while the moderates and liberals are more likely to be found in the Underground. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)
In particular, the fascist Nazi-collaborationist NSZ represented one of the largest, if not the largest, movement among the partisan bands in the Polish Underground:
The NSZ appears to be the largest of the organized Resistance groups. Politically it stands on the extreme Right, having developed chiefly out of such pre-war elements as ONR and Stronnictwo Narodowe (National Party) – now outlawed. Although the NSZ officially deplores mistreatment of the Jews, it has been responsible for anti-Semitic excess in a number of cases. The head of the NSZ in Poland is reliably reported to be Boleslaw Piasecki, successor to the late Stanislaw Piasecki (no relation). Its military head is reported be Colonel Andrzej Rutkowski (not identical with Colonel Rutkowski, Chief of Informacja [i..e. Polish intelligence]). (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 4) (IMG)
See also: Poland’s Home Army (AK) receives funding from Axis Powers
The WIN, the second largest Polish Underground guerrilla movement after the Great Patriotic War, was ‘similar politically’ to the NSZ in that they too were fascist bandits:
Wolnosc i Niepodleglosc (Freedom and Independence)
Next to the NSZ (to which it is similar politically) WIN is considered the largest Partisan organization.
(Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 4) (IMG)
Both of these organizations were the bulk of the guerrilla bands and were headquartered in Poland:
The largest and most important groups … [are] NSZ (National Armed Forces) and WIN (Freedom and Independence) … [which] have their headquarters in Poland. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)
Of course, the ultimate headquarters of these terror organizations was in London.
Much as how some criminal gangs and syndicates are named after their godfathers and crime bosses, many of the Polish Underground guerrillas were named after their chiefs as well. Indeed, the WIN and NSZ were not coherent organizations, but were rather coalitions of fascist bandits. Both organizations were made up of godfather-named local gangs. Referring to the WIN and NSZ, the US intelligence document stated:
To these latter groups belong also their numerous guerrilla bands which owe allegiance solely to their own chieftains. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)
This was of course the situation with other guerrilla bands as well:
In addition to these groupings … there are numerous local bands, of varying strengths which are sometimes nameless, and sometimes identified only by the noms de guerre of their chiefs. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, pp. 3-4) (IMG)
The very name of a guerrilla movement matters much because it sheds light on the group’s ideology or platform; the fact that the Polish Underground guerrillas were named not after a particular ideology, ‘ideal’, or slogan, but rather after their warlords and godfathers reveals the fascist cult-like mentality of the bandit ‘movement’. Indeed, it is questionable if one could call these guerrillas ‘partisans’ at all considering their banditry. These:
pseudo-Partisan bands … although they profess to identify themselves with one anti-Government or another, must be considered as purely bandit groups with no political objectives whatever. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 1) (IMG)
The name ‘Freedom and Independence’ (WIN) and the ‘National Armed Forces’ (NSZ) were solely professional liberal names acting as propaganda cover for the banditry of the Polish Underground.
There of course were other smaller guerrilla organizations in Poland:
Polska Armia Wyzwolenia (Polish Army of Liberation)
The AW is a numerically insignificant group. Claims have been made that the AW has from 300,000 to 400,000 organized troops with reserves of over a million, and that it is the successor to the AK.
Comment: There has been no confirmation of these exaggerated estimates, and they seem to be the product of wishful thinking.
(Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 4) (IMG)
Wojska Powstancze (Insurgent Troops)
One of the smaller Rightist Partisan groups.
(Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 4) (IMG)
Some reasons for joining the Underground guerrillas were ‘to escape the authorities’, ‘excitement and adventure’ or to become mercenaries:
The composition of the ranks in heterogeneous. Although some join as a result of political conviction, some to escape the authorities and others for excitement and adventure, there are those attracted by mercenary considerations. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 3) (IMG)
Another CIA document titled ‘Polish Underground’ provides more specific details about the character of the Polish Underground guerrillas. The document acknowledged that the ‘great majority’ of the Polish Underground were criminals:
A large percentage of underground members are common criminals such as speculators, black marketeers, smugglers, thieves, robbers and murderers. Another group in the underground is that of the “professional” resistance man who knows no other way of life. (…). The great majority of those who live illegally and who hide in the forests of Poland are, therefore, army deserters, common criminals, young men who have committed a misdemeanor, youthful war-time underground assistants – unwitting couriers, ammunition keepers and the like – who continued to associate with the underground and who, since the war have been either unwilling or unable to rehabilitate themselves. (Polish Underground, CIA, Date Distributed: 7 October 1952, pp. 1-2) (IMG)
A smaller portion of the Polish Underground was made up of the ‘lesser’ criminals:
There are other elements of the Polish population which provide lesser numbers of men to the clandestine resistance forces. These include young persons who have no political or ideological motivation, but who have joined because they have committed some minor crime and because they dread the few months in jail…. (Polish Underground, CIA, Date Distributed: 7 October 1952, pp. 1-2) (IMG)
This category included such people as:
a youngster who may have drunkenly tried to molest a girl…. (Polish Underground, CIA, Date Distributed: 7 October 1952, p. 2) (IMG)
That is, the ‘lesser’ criminals were, at ‘best’ case scenario, rapists. The criminals were led by the wartime leaders of the Polish Underground:
These forest underground groups are almost always directed by experienced war-time underground members who now either live illegally under assumed names or who have managed to reappear as accepted citizens while concealing their present interest in ant-regime action. (…). Almost universally, the chiefs are motivated by political considerations such as hatred of Russia, Polish nationalism, hatred of Communism or personal political ambition. (Polish Underground, CIA, Date Distributed: 7 October 1952, p. 2) (IMG)
The information presented by the CIA document clearly demonstrates that the Polish Underground did not respect freedom of opinion and expression and that they engaged in terrorist activity. The Polish Underground conducted terrorist operations against non-combatant communists:
These groups … conduct actions against Communist agitators propagandizing collectivization and speaking for the USSR; (Poland: Polish Underground, CIA, Date Distributed: 7 October 1952, p. 2.) (IMG)
The Polish Underground guerrillas were literally bandits. They attacked trains and public warehouses to loot whatever material they needed:
The procurement of supplies appears to present no problem. Whatever cannot be obtained in any other way is gotten by holding up trains and looting public warehouses. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 3) (IMG)
Attacks on infrastructure were common. The CIA document commented:
It is believed that the underground was responsible for the following incident: The flow of power to electric trains was suddenly cut off one day in the spring of 1952 for several hours. Trains running on the Warsaw-Pruszkow and Warsaw-Grojec lines halted. Because of this some 360,000 workers were unable to report for work that day. It is not definitely known whether the interruption was due to sabotage or to a technical breakdown. (Poland: Polish Underground, CIA, Date Distributed: 7 October 1952, p. 3) (IMG)
More tellingly, after the War, the Polish Underground attacked the farms, especially the collective farms. They attacked Gminna SpóÅ‚dzielnia ‘Samopomoc ChÅ‚opska’ (Communal Cooperative ‘Peasant Self-Help’), the Spoldzielnie Produkcyjne (Production Cooperatives), and Polskie Gospodarstwa Rolne (Polish Farms):
Communist collective offices, such as Sampomoc Chlopska, Spoldzielnie Produkcyjne and Polskie Gospodarstwa Rolne also provide targets for active opposition. (Poland: Polish Underground, CIA, Date Distributed: 7 October 1952, pp. 2-3) (IMG)
Western propagandists have always alleged that the Polish Underground received the support of the majority of the Polish population. Not true. As the CIA confirmed, among the Polish people,:
A certain feeling arose against the Partisans, based on the accusation that by continuing their senseless struggle they were only aggravating the serious economic condition of the country, causing needless bloodshed…. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 7) (IMG)
Furthermore, the CIA document was absolutely clear that behind these Polish Underground guerrilla was General Anders and his so-called ‘Polish government-in-exile’ in London:
At the same time, political alignments became clearer: Behind the Partisans stood General Anders and the “London” Poles, and behind them stood the British. In the minds of the Polish people, Anders and the London group are identified with the large capitalists and feudal landowners. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 7) (IMG)
The deep ties between the MI6-backed group led by General Anders and the terrorists in Poland led to the overwhelming hatred of the Polish proletariat and peasantry at the time towards the so-called ‘Polish government-in-exile’:
it cannot be said that many Poles would want the London group in control of the Polish State. The workers and peasants especially feel that should the London group come to power it would mean a return to the intolerable conditions of 1939, with the … distasteful dictatorship of the Right. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 7) (IMG)
Contrary to the reports of the CIA-backed press, the Polish people at that time despised the MI6-backed ‘London Poles’, after having experienced the harsh conditions prior to 1939, as well as the terrorism and treason of the Polish Underground guerrillas during and after the War. The Polish government’s intelligence service:
are interested in the Resistance primarily because some of its [i.e. Resistance’s] elements not only receive material support from abroad but provide assistance to foreign intelligence agencies [e.g. MI6] in their anti-Polish and anti-Soviet operations. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 2) (IMG)
Many people … deprecate [Partisan] activities on the grounds that they cause senseless bloodshed and will accomplish no permanent good. In such regions as Rzeszow, Bialystok, Lublin, and the Swietokrzyskie Mountains – where Partisan activity is strongest – … even those elements which otherwise would be inimical are kept in line by fear of the Partisans. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 3) (IMG)
Those Poles located near the mountains or forests suffered the most, because those terrains best served the guerrillas leading to their mass concentration there:
There is Partisan activity of one sort or another throughout Poland, but it is concentrated in terrain which affords protection and concealment, i.e., in areas which are forested or mountainous or both. Thus, the Partisans are strongest in the northeast, the southeast, along the Polish-Slovak border, and in the Kielce area of central Poland. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 4) (IMG)
The extreme unpopularity of the Polish Underground guerrillas is also reflected in the relatively small number of recruits they had:
It is difficult to make even an approximate estimate of Partisan strength. On the basis of information at hand, however, it is felt that 40,000 to 50,000 men would be a reasonable approximation for the autumn of 1946. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 3) (IMG)
According to conservative estimates, the “Freedom Movement» has about 25,000 members, many of whom are armed with automatic weapons. (Government Moves Against the Underground, CIA, December 16, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)
Note that the ‘Freedom Movement’ was simply an alternative term for:
Anti-Communist Underground activists in Poland…. (Government Moves Against the Underground, CIA, December 16, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)
(….).
The strength of the counter-revolutionary partisan movement, therefore, ranged between 25,000 to 50,000 which, relative to the 400,000-strong Polish People’s Army (AL) during the Great Patriotic War, was rather small. It also was far smaller than the 500,000 to 1,000,000 members of the PPR in 1947. As the Underground guerrillas served as the successor organizations to the Polish AK, their stronghold was also in Central Poland and they were led by General Szary:
Throughout the war [Gory Swietokrzyskie in Central Poland] was an AK stronghold, and it still is the headquarters of Szary, one of the most famous Partisan leaders in Poland. [According to the] former deputy to the UBP Commandant of the Kielce area, Szary’s forces number between 7,000 and 80,000 men. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 6) (IMG)
According to conservative estimates, the “Freedom Movement» has about 25,000 members, many of whom are armed with automatic weapons. (Government Moves Against the Underground, CIA, December 16, 1949, p. 1) (IMG)
It is difficult to make even an approximate estimate of Partisan strength. On the basis of information at hand, however, it is felt that 40,000 to 50,000 men would be a reasonable approximation for the autumn of 1946. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 3) (IMG)
In Eastern Poland, the local partisan formations were far smaller. Nevertheless, they exaggerated their membership figures:
One report estimated Partisan strength in [Byalistok in Eastern Poland] at 10,000 but this is considered exaggerated. (Survey of the Illegal Opposition in Poland, CIA, July 1, 1947, p. 5) (IMG)
Fuentes:
https://sovinform.net/Poland-AK-Terrorists-Rapists-Thieves.htm