

Mac OS hacX

Things you need to know about your Mac

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\$ whois mayhem

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Member / Board of Directors:

AIP, AIPSI/ISSA, CLUSIT, Italian Linux Society, IT-ISAC,
LUGVR, OPSI, Metro Olografix, No1984.org, OpenBeer,
Sikurezza.org, Spippolatori, VoIPSA.

CrISTAL, Hacker's Profiling Project, Recursiva.org

Credits

These slides are possible thanks to the help of some Italian hackers that always love to share information:

Andrea Ghirardini, pila@pilasecurity.com

Guido Bolognesi, zen@kill-9.it


Matteo G.P. Flora, lk@lastknight.com

*“Those who don't understand UNIX
are condemned to reinvent it, **poorly**.”*

Henry **S**pencer

Apple MAC AD






How to obtain a more secure environment using MacOSX?

Screensaver

Autologon

Pair remote control

Malware



Library Randomization

How security is changing?

From buffer overflow to application flaws...


*“... and nowadays a ssh remote root is a **dead dream**...”*

anonymous

Apple solution to BO

Library Randomization randomly **distributes** those commands throughout memory every time the operating system loads.

Thus, even if an attacker finds a buffer overflow vulnerability and pushes his commands onto your system, it's extremely **difficult** for him to turn that into a working exploit.



SandBoxes

SandBoxing

Think about **isolating** a baby
in a place where he can play
Do the same with an application!

Web Malware

Malware can **compromise** my browser

But my browser must not access
all my system resources

Policy

We can create some rules:
the browser will **only** access
authorized resources

It is native on MacOSX:

```
coniglio:~ mayhem$ man sandbox-exec
```

```
coniglio:~ mayhem$ cd /usr/share/sandbox/
```

bsd.sb	portmap.sb	named.sb
mDNSResponder.sb	ntpd.sb	syslogd.sb

and simple to use

```
$ sandbox-exec -f profile-file applicazione
```


```
$ cat /usr/share/sandbox/named.sb
```

```
(allow network*)
```

```
(allow file-write* file-read-data file-read-  
metadata
```

```
(regex "( /private)?/var/run/named\\.pid$"
```

```
"^/Library/Logs/named\\.log$") )
```



Access Control List

File system

The file system is HFS+

Provides journaling

access-list and extended attributes

/bin/ls -l

```
coniglio:~ mayhem$ /bin/ls -l
```

```
total 24
```

drwx-----+	8	mayhem	mayhem	272	May	13	18:45	Desktop
-rw-r--r--@	1	root	mayhem	1024	Dec	10	10:41	Desktop DB
-rw-r--r--@	1	root	mayhem	2	Dec	9	23:11	Desktop DF
drwx-----+	35	mayhem	mayhem	1190	May	8	19:40	Documents

/bin/ls -le

```
coniglio:~ mayhem$ /bin/ls -le
```

```
total 24
```

```
drwx-----+  8 mayhem  mayhem   272 May 13 18:45 Desktop
```

```
0: group:everyone deny delete
```

```
-rw-r--r--@   1 root      mayhem  1024 Dec 10 10:41 Desktop DB
```

```
-rw-r--r--@   1 root      mayhem     2 Dec  9 23:11 Desktop DF
```

```
drwx-----+ 35 mayhem  mayhem  1190 May  8 19:40 Documents
```

```
0: group:everyone deny delete
```

/bin/chmod

```
# chmod +a "admin allow write" file1
```

```
# chmod +a "guest deny read" file1
```


```
# ls -le
```

```
-rw-r--r--+ 1 juser  wheel  0 Apr 28 14:06 file1
```

```
owner: juser
```

```
1: guest deny read
```

```
2: admin allow write
```

Monitor

Why monitoring?

It's always important to **know**
what a binary program tries to do
both from a **security** point of view
and from a **performance** point of view

It is important to know

which **file** are created / accessed / deleted

how much CPU / **memory** is used

lookup **thread** / child processes

network activities

dtruss


Used to run **strace** on your PC?

Did you find an unknown binary?

```
root@coniglio# dtruss /bin/ls
```

Running processes

It is possible to attach dtruss to
already **running** processes
to monitor syscalls



dtrace

It is useful to create **profiles**
of system wide parameters to monitor

Pre-compiled libraries can be found:
<http://www.solarisinternals.com/si/dtrace/>

I Instruments

It is the **GUI** provided by Developer Tools

It analyzes any activity of **running**
or new **launched** applications


Instruments screencast



Default processes

It is important to know what are the default system services. A **comprehensive** and **updated** document can be found at:

<http://www.westwind.com/reference/OS-X/background-processes.html>



Firewall

Tiger or I0.4

Traffic based firewall

BSD IPFW product


Powerful and flexible

Complex syntax for a *normal* user

Leopard or 10.5

Application based firewall

Configuring a firewall?



Application Firewall

It puts a **signature** file inside the application

Some applications check their **integrity**

Some applications **stop** working

From AppFW to IPFW

Thanks God: IPFW is still **present**
You **can** use it from command line

IPFW

```
root@coniglio# ipfw -h
```

ipfw syntax summary (but please do read the ipfw(8) manpage):

ipfw [-acdefTnNpqS] <command> where <command> is one of:

```
add [num] [set N] [prob x] RULE-BODY
```

```
{pipe|queue} N config PIPE-BODY
```

```
[pipe|queue] {zero|delete|show} [N{,N}]
```

```
set [disable N... enable N...] | move [rule] X to Y | swap X Y | show
```

IPFW GUI

Simpler interface = fewer errors



Simple interface = more users

WaterRoof


This **Italian** project is an
IPFW firewall frontend for Mac OS X 10.5
with an easy interface and many options.

Features include dynamic rules, bandwidth management,
NAT configuration and port redirection, pre-defined
rule sets and a wizard for **easy** configuration. You can
also watch logs and graphic statistics.

WaterRoof



<http://www.hanyanet.com/waterroof/index.html>



Bonjour

Bonjour

Also known as zero-configuration networking, enables **automatic discovery of computers, devices, and services** on IP networks.

Bonjour uses industry standard IP protocols to allow devices to automatically discover each other without the need to enter IP addresses or configure DNS servers. In order to provide a true zero-configuration experience, Bonjour requires that devices implement three essential things.


Requirements

- ➔ Allocate IP addresses without a DHCP server.
- ➔ Translate between names and addresses without a DNS server.
- ➔ Locate or **advertise services** without using a directory server.


Useful for...

- ✓ Easily connect to printers
- ✓ Easily connect to services (i.e.VNC)
- *Enumerate*
- *Replicate worms*

Find VNC servers



or RDP server




Disable Bonjour

```
launchctl unload -w /System/Library/\nLaunchDaemons/com.apple.mDNSResponder.plist
```

To re-enable it:

```
launchctl load -w /System/Library/\nLaunchDaemons/com.apple.mDNSResponder.plist
```



FileVault

FileVault

Will provide **encrypted** volumes

Can **transparently** encrypt the whole home

Can create volumes on CD / USB Key

/Users

FileVault will create a sparse **bundle** disk image

AES 128 encrypted

Automagically mounted at **login**

Logged off user

Empty /Users/mayhem

/Users/.mayhem containing the encrypted volume

The password of the volume is always
corresponding to the user password

sparse image

It is a **unique** big file
must be maintained
default until 10.4
preserved when migrating

sparse bundle image

a lot of 8 MB bands (*files*)

easier to maintain

default since 10.5

No deniability

FileVault does not provide any **plausible** deniability feature.

Any analyzer will easily **understand** if you are using one or more encrypted volumes.

Break in

Is it **possible** to violate FileVault security?

Past

Mac OS X 10.3

In need to analyze a FileVault volume

Get in touch with a developer

Retrieved the user password from swap space

After some days Apple published a new **patch** :)

Present

Mac OS X 10.4

In need to analyze a FileVault volume

Windows **shares** enabled

This create a NTLM **copy** of the user password :)

Future


Mac OS X 10.5

In need to analyze a FileVault volume

...

<http://citp.princeton.edu/mory/>





Gaining root locally

Conditions

No ability to **boot** from CD

Able to use **single** user mode

No time / possibility to use **John** the Ripper

Legacy way

CMD-S

```
# /sbin/mount -wu /
```

```
# /sbin/SystemStarter
```

```
# nidump passwd .
```

OR

```
# passwd root
```

What to do


```
sh-3.2# rm /var/db/.AppleSetupDone
```

At next reboot **setup** will start

Then you can **create** a new administrator
and **take** any needed privilege / authorization


Curious content :)

```
<dict>
  <key>AppleSpam</key>
  <string>NO</string>
  <key>Location</key>
  <string>P</string>
  <key>Occupation</key>
  <string>5</string>
  <key>OthersSpam</key>
  <string>NO</string>
</dict>
```



Secure Deletion


Native feature



You can do it directly from your trash bin

Many 3rd part application exists

Erase free space



Methods used

Erase Free Space Options

These options erase files deleted to prevent their recovery. All files that you have not deleted are left unchanged.

☐ Zero Out Deleted Files

Writes zeros over all the free space on your disk that deleted files might occupy. This option provides good data security in a minimum amount of time.

☒ 7-Pass Erase of Deleted Files

Writes data over all the free space on your disk seven times. This option provides a highly secure erasure of deleted files. A 7-Pass erase takes 7 times longer than the time required for the Zero Out option.


☐ 35-Pass Erase of Deleted Files

Writes data over the free space on your disk 35 times. This option provides highly effective data security against the recovery of deleted files. It requires 35 times more time to perform than the Zero Out option.



Cancel

Erase Free Space



Harden

Do it easy

There are a **lot** of things to fix

Many different **sintaxes**

Mainly command line

It would be useful to have a **simple** tool

Bastille Unix

The Bastille Hardening program "locks down" an operating system, **proactively** configuring the system for increased security and **decreasing** its susceptibility to compromise. Bastille can also assess a system's current state of hardening, granularly **reporting** on each of the security settings with which it works.

Assess

In its assessment mode, it builds a report intended to **teach** the user about **available** security settings as well as inform the user as to which settings have been tightened.

Harden


In its default hardening mode, it interactively **asks** the user questions, **explains** the topics of those questions, and **builds** a policy based on the user's answers.

It then **applies** the policy to the system.

Understand

Being **OSS** can be useful even only to understand which parameters are evaluated

<http://bastille-linux.sourceforge.net/index.html>



Nice tools

iAlertu


Basically iAlertU is a car alarm for your Apple Mac. iAlertU uses the built in **motion** to trigger the alarm and the **isight** to capture the image of the thief.

<http://sourceforge.net/projects/ialertu/>

Proximity

Proximity monitors the proximity of your mobile phone or other **bluetooth** device and executes custom **AppleScripts** when the device goes out of range or comes into range of your computer.

http://www.apple.com/downloads/macosx/system_disk_utilities/proximity.html



C Conclusions

Am I the apple or the mouth?

Apple OS is a UNIX

you can harden it and make it secure.

As usual you **have to know** the mechanisms to adopt and which **limits** your security has.



Web-o-grafy

<http://developer.apple.com/bonjour/>

<http://www.macosxhints.com/article.php?story=20050707222434355>

<http://db.tidbits.com/article/9251>

<http://securosis.com/2007/11/01/investigating-the-leopard-firewall/>


<http://www.apple.com/macosx/features/300.html#security>

<http://db.tidbits.com/article/9294>

<http://www.matasano.com/log/981/a-roundup-of-leopard-security-features/>

<http://www.itwire.com/content/view/15143/53/>

<http://www.scribd.com/doc/40500/New-Admin-Setup-Mac-OS-X-How-to>



Questions?

Thank you!

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Pescara, 22 Agosto 2008



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